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FEELING AND REASON AS A RECURRENT TOPIC 
OF LEGAL CULTURE: 
A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR J.C.SMITI王'SPAPER* 
Mitsukuni Ya抑制**
First， 1 would like to express my admiration for professor J.C. Smith's 
grasp of the depth and scope of the J apanese concepts of self and we-
consciousness， especially after such a short visit to Japan.1 1 agree with him 
concerning the relevance of psychology， psychoanalysis， and psychiatry in 
the study of legal and political theory. However， I feel there is something in 
his argument that remains to be examined and discussed. 
As the tit1e of Professor SIi1ith's article2 indicates， his purpose in con-
trasting Japanese and Western ideas of the self is to find a possible reconciled 
unity. In doing so， he emphasizes the “emotion"， '‘fee1ing" and “compas-
sion" shared by the Japanese， and its contrast to Western “reason". In order 
to understand Japan， Westerners must recognize its emotional foundation， 
reflected by the Buddha of Justice at the Supreme Court of Japan. Indeed， 
this is a surprisingly beautiful image that we ourselves might have sought， 
and simply generalized. 1 admit that simplification and generalization are 
useful， and shortly 1 shall use them， too. 
Simplifica.tion， however， often leads to over-simplification and tends to 
disregard the multiplicity or pluralistic aspects of matters we are dealing 
with. 1 do not accuse Professor Smith of this， exactly， but 1 smell something 
of it in his argument， aswell as in Dr. Doi's Anatomy 01 Dependence3 which 
underlies Professor Smith's thesis. Let me say as follows: 
1. FEELING AND REASON 
1.“Feeling" is certainly to be emphasized for the purpose of this 
comparative study especially since this is the age of the so-called rehabilita-
tion of practical philosophy， and the gradualdecline of the emphasis on 
reason. If a culture overemphasizes feelings and emotion beyond their useful 
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lirnits， however， itrisks the reappearance of nightrnares such as Mi1itarisrn 
and Nationa1isirn in Japan， and Nazisrn in Gerrnany. This rnight be a 
surprising suggestion. Professor Srnith did not raise such a possibility. 
Perhaps he refrained out of goodwi1 or perhaps such consideration were 
outside the scope of his acadernic intention. The forces of our tirne， 
however， are so cornplicated and flexible， social values founded on ernotion 
rnight produce those nightrnares again. It is sti1 necessary for us to practice 
the restraint of reason while perrnitting feeling its rneaning and role. 
2. Dr. Doi's Anatomy 01 Dependence shows us a fascinating scenario. 
Dependence (that is， amae) is stated in the following ways: 
[As the infant's mind] develops it gradually realizes that itself and its mother are 
independent existences， and comes to fel the mother as something indispensable-
to itself; it is the craving for c10se contact thus developed that constitutes， one rnight 
say， amae.4 
This rnother-child relationship， he said， will “be observed in al babies， 
whether frorn East or West.吋 Dr.Doi also pointed out that the amae 
relationship is cornrnon not only to the J apanese psyche， but also to the 
Japanese social world. To begin with， Dr. Doi used a reductive rnethod to 
find amae in the rnother-child relationship; he then used. a rnethod of en-
largernent to explain the relevance of amae in the social world. 1n this 
argurnent， he is both very skillful and persuasive. However， 1 feel that he 
goes too far in both the reduction and the enlargernent. Are there not 
several factors besides amae proper to express the ernotional nature of the 
Japanese? 1s there not a very cornplex social structure6 with rnany different 
aspects despite the apparent hornogeneity in Japan? The sarne questions 
apply， tosorne extent， toProfessor Srnith's ideas. 
3. On the table at page 13， Professor Srnith describes the Eastern， 
including the Japanese rnentality as a cornbined weak 1-consciousness and 
strong we-consciousness， in clear contrast with the Western rnentality of 
weak we-consciousness and strong 1-consciousness? Such a generalization 
should be supplernented or supported by careful consideration of each 
society's different layers， and the individual rnentalities of those belonging to 
different professional or social groups. Even within social group's we rnay 
discern a sub-group which shares a cornrnon consciousness. The Shδwa 
hitoketa-generation or “residents in a too-crowded city zone"， or an alurnni 
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circ1e of a famous， time-honoured university are a few examples of a social 
group which shares a strong inner bond consciousness against outsiders. 
4. A related problem is that of the self within the social group. After 
the end of World War I the dominant trend for both Japanese and foreign 
scholars was to see individuals as submerged in social groups under the 
pressure of Japanese tradition. Therefore， to emancipate them from these 
traditional bonds and to encourage individuality were considered urgent 
tasks at that time. During the reconstruction of J apanese society， in an 
atmosphere of peace and democracy， however， that trend gradually reversed 
and became a reexamination and reevaluation of the warm human relation-
ships of the traditional Japan. In a sense， the latter trend emphasizes the 
quantitative difference between the Japanese and Westem mentalities， while 
the former emphasized the qualitative. It seems to me both Professor 
Smith's and Dr. Doi's ideas approach the latter. As far as the Japanese 
mentality is concemed， 1 think both approaches are stil necessary. 
5. To search for a way from psyche to society 1 draw at first the follow-
ing figure. 
Figure 1 
Society 
Social Stratum 
There are at least three possible implications: 
(1) Direct line froITI Psyche to Society. 
In such a case， other factors like Fami1y， Social Group， and so onare 
looked through， but not disregarded. We may find in (1) a model of so・
called “civil society" consisting of equal and free individuals where the civil 
(nation)State wi1l be overlapped with Society. 
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(2) Triangle from Psyche through Family to Society. 
In this case， Family plays a bridging role between Psyche and Society. 
Patriarcha1ism may be a good example of (2). 
An example of this may well be seen in our contemporary society， a 
so-called pluralistic society. 
3. “Star" or “Diamond" Figure consisting of al elements， that is， Psyche-
Family-Society-Social Stratum-Social Group-Social Class. 
(3-A) As a variant of (3) we may find a plura1istic， but democratically 
organized State as not so far from Society， while (3B) may be appearing 
around us， for instance， asa next step 1 shall pay attention to law and mercy 
in our contemporary society， the regulatory State supported by corpQratism 
or paternalism. 
I. LAW AND MERCY 
Professor Smith's main interest is to reconcile law and mercy. This 
interest becomes immediately apparent if we remember his admiration of the 
statue of Justice placed along one of the walls in the Supreme Court of 
Japan.8 That statue has a head of Buddha and no b1indfold. He says， the 
“unconstrained gaze of the Buddha suggests that emotions such as compas回
sion can be consistent with the rule oflaw".9 
What he intends in this description and evaluation is to make a clear 
contrast of the Eastern and Western ideas of law. To return to the statue， on 
the Western statue of Justice，“the scale symbo1izes the formal， impartial 
nature of law， the sword the inevitab1ity of the penalties and remedies 
prescribed by law fol1owing transgression against it， and the b1indfold the 
exclusion of al factors， fee1ings， prejudices and emotions which deflect the 
ful1 operation of the law".lO 
Emotions can be consistent with the rule of law in J apan， but not in the 
West. He shows， generally speaking， a great interest in the Japanese attitude 
towards that problem of law and mercy. It seems to indicate Professor 
Smith's real commitment to such a Japanese direction of problem耐resolution.
1 must wonder again why th，is isso. 
He noticed in the Western law a kind of dilemma. For instance， the 
“stress on individua1ism in western cu1ture is a product of a be1ief system， a 
central feature of which is a set of .fundamental or natural rights which 
guaranteeor protect personal 1iberty by preventing wrongful interference. 
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One of the most basic tenets of this set is the right of equality before the 
Law. By assuming the existence of such a right， matters of sex， order of 
birth， family membership， race or skin colour become irrelevant for the 
purposes of our moral and legal rights and duties. ... However， our gender 
identity， oder of birth， family， colour and race are critical matters in 
formulating the We-consciousness which is an essential part of our concept 
of self. Thus the conceptual framework within which we formulate a part of 
our I-consciousness conflicts with the kind of conceptual framework within 
which we develop our We-consicousness. ...... The result is substantial 
dialectical tension within the western psyche".n 
From this aspect he proceeds as follows: the “western legal and political 
tradition has attempted to achieve a sense of community identification 
through transcendental ideals of morality， justice or goodness. Such ideo-
logical paths to community inevitably fail， since conflicting theories or 
views of what is the good， and the tendency of people to interpret the good 
or justice in terms of their own self interests， prevent a shared consensus 
regarding the ideals which the community should reflect. ... In any case， 
logic， argument and intellectualization cannot in themselves produce the 
emotional basis for the sense of We-consciousness which must exist for 
true community."12 
Again， we find his focus of interest is directed to a true community， 
and in turn， to emotion. Through the path described above， he reached an 
idealof “a true person of no status"13 (Mu i shin jin). This ideal itselflooks 
like very attractive. But how can we connect the reality of man-made law in 
man-more or less-made society with such an ideal must stil remain a hard 
problem to resolve. 
We must notice， moreover， that such a dilemma in the West also is 
easily seen in J apan since “J apan inherits these contradictions in its Post-
World War 1 Constitution". 14 As far as this aspect of the problem is con-
cerned， the Japanese situation is not far from the Western. To understand 
the situation as we have been involved in it， 1 feel it useful for me and the 
readers to use several figures. 
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This figure shows， at first glance， Japanese law as akin to Western law 
to a considerable degree. But the connection is on the formal level. The 
formal level is not sharply edged， but is connected with the informal level， 
even the dai1y level， through various channels. One example is legal rules and 
principles with open-ended concepts.1S As open嶋ended，these concepts may 
well be used to respond to social demands of an extremely different nature. 
Social demands， people's expectations are rich in variety， often conf1icting 
with each other even in one country， not to mention in each different 
countries like Japan and the Western countries. Arising in an ordinary life， 
these expectations gradually take the form of informal rules， principles， 
eventually to be taken seriously on the formal level， for example， through 
judicial interpretation or judicial law making. In J apan， asis often pointed 
out， these are in a sense the emotional foundation of the formal law and 
administration of justice. But this may also be the case with in the West. 
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What is worth noticing is that following ordinary rules or criticizing accord-
ing to rules is morality on the daily level in the West， especial1y in the U.S 
(Rulism)， while partly it is the case with Japan， partly another side of 
J apanese daily life is based on emotion and human relatedness. It is the 
last point which Professor Smith emphasizes as to J apan. 1 agree with him 
on this point， but 1 am not of the same opinion as him in so far as 1 
recognize a partial possibility of “rulistic" daily life existing in J apan. It 
seems to me that even in Japan， the ordinary， daily level does not exhaus-
tively consist of emotion. 
1 would say that a nuance may be much more understandable if we add 
the situation of a country like Papua-New Guinea where many tribal customs 
stil mail1tain a strong binding force while the formal law of the Western 
type， too， has been imported and partly accepted for many years戸，17
Informal rules and principles 1 have no intention of explaining in detail， 
but 1 merely reserved a space for these in order to take into consideration 
various informal rules， principles， standards of social groups from gigantic 
corporations in our highly industrialized society through the legal profession， 
medical profession. . . . . . . toordinary people (living law). 
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We can see the sameproblem from a bit different angle in Fig. 3. It 
shows the formal and informal level mentioned above replaced respectively 
by institution as the second layer and first layer which are accompanied， and 
as a resu1t characterized， by many surroundings戸 Theright side we can 
count a number of standards from abstract to concrete， and vice versa. The 
left side shows simply how two institutions are related to fact and value. 
Bifurcation of fact and value has been developed in the Western history 
of ideas and certainly well considered. Here in Fig. 3.， however， we can find 
a gradual development from mere physical fact through meaningful fact， 
normative fact to normative ought whi1e taking it for granted to give a 
meaning to bifurcation. A line or dotted line is a mere indication of 
complex relation of left-central-right or up-middle-down. 
We may. find a further question about a relation of Fig. 1 with Fig. 3. 
Figure 1 isto be read on the level of institution as the first layer. As Figure 
1 isalso to be interpreted in an extension to the State level， itleads to and is 
dynamically connected with institution as the second layer. Here we can 
again reread the formal modern Western type of law as wel1 as the right 
system as sUITounded by Figure 1， particularly backed up by the State， and 
at the same time informalliving law in our dai1y ordinary life as by Figure 1， 
that is， Psyche-Family-social Stratum etc. 
Figure 4. 
(B) 
(A) 
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1 would like to make a tentative conclusion by using Fig. 4. As you see， 
this is a figure for showing each three different institutions (second， first 
and sub-layers) apt to modify themselves， and therefore interrelated with 
each other. But it is certain that strength or depth of interrelation delicately 
depends on and changes according to the surroundings which can not be 
found in Fig. 4 which is very simplified. What 1 tried to explain in Fig. 3. 
may wel1 be reread here in a dynamic relation.19 Institution as the second 
layer including formallaw in Japan appears ambivalent， that is， independent 
of and dependent on the first layer (no need to mention sub-layer) and vice 
versa. Even though appearing ambivalent， itgives us an image of what a 
reality is. A reccurrent topic of legal culture， feeling and reason， as keenly 
discussed by Prof. Smith may be much more clarified if it would be careful1y 
examined again from this perspective戸，21
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